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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME X WINTER, 1956 NUMBER 1
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND RECIPROCAL CLAIMS
FROM A SINGLE ACCIDENT
By
Robert E. Keeton *
A SINGLE motor vehicle collision often results in several
claims. If, as is usually true today, liability insurance cov-
erage is in effect with respect to the operation of at least one of the
vehicles, some special problems are presented as to the relation-
ship between the reciprocal claims of the motor vehicle operators
against each other, and as to the relationships among the persons
interested in these reciprocal claims, including liability insur-
ance companies.
A collision occurs between vehicles owned and operated by C
and D respectively, both persons suffering personal injuries and
both vehicles being damaged. C brings suit against D. Under the
Federal Rules and those of some of the states, D's reciprocal
claim' against C is a "compulsory counterclaim" in the sense that
it is barred if not asserted in the same proceeding.2 Even in the
absence of such a requirement, the judgment in the suit of C v. D
is likely to affect the claim of D against C; under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the judgment may be conclusive between the
*B.B.A. 1940, LL.B. 1941, University of Texas. Formerly Associate Professor of Law
at Southern Methodist University; Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard since 1954.
1 The term "claim" in the singular form is here intended to include both the assertion
of a right to damages for personal injury and the assertion of a right to damages to the
vehicle. These assertions are sometimes treated as separate "claims" or "causes of action"
when collision insurance has been in effect and the collision insurer is the assignee or
subrogee of part or all of the right to recovery for damages to the vehicle. E.g., compare
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947) with Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1953). Also see RESTATEMENT, JUDc-
MENTS §62 (1942) and Notes, 64 A.L.R. 663, 668 (1929), 127 A.L.R. 1081, 1082 (1940),
and 22 A.L.R. 2d 1455 (1952). The effect of collision insurance on the relationship
between reciprocal claims and claimants is not discussed in this article, but generally
the problems arising from divergent interests of the insured and the insurance company
are analogous to the problems incident to liability insurance, with which this article
is concerned.2 E.g., FED. R. Civ. PRo. 13(a) ; Tsx. R. Civ. PRO. 97(a).
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parties as to questions of fact, such as negligence, actually litigated
and determined by the judgment.8 When no liability insurance is
involved, this result is generally sound.4 Likewise sound in non-
insurance cases is a rule of interpretation that a compromise by
which D makes payment to C on account of C's claim against D
will be construed as an accord and satisfaction barring also D's
claim against C, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary.r
If C, D, or both have liability insurance, however, the new
factors incident to such insurance require reappraisal of rules
concerning settlement, compulsory counterclaims and collateral
estoppel by judgment. Has a liability insurance company the power
to affect the claim of its insured against another? If so, in what
ways can it do so, and has the company any responsibility to the
insured regarding the exercise of this power?
I. SETTLEMENT WITHOUT COURT PROCEEDINGS
The typical automobile liability insurance policy contains a
provision substantially as follows:
Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments.
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for
bodily injury liability and for property damage liability, the company
shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sick-
ness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof,
8 E.g., A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 68-72 (1942 and 1948 Supp.).
4 See Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942). Applica-
tion of this doctrine may be unsound, however, in the case of a judgment rendered by a
court having jurisdiction limited as to amount. Suppose C sues D in a court having
jurisdiction limited to claims not in excess of $200, and recovers judgment upon findings
that C was not negligent and D was negligent. According to the rule stated in RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS, § 71, comment d, second paragraph (1942), collateral estoppel would
not be applicable if D thereafter sued C in a court of general jurisdiction on a $25,000
claim arising from the same accident. But this paragraph was later omitted because
inconsistent with the weight of authority. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §§ 343-44 (1948
Supp.), citing Note, 147 A.L.R. 196, 226-232; Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F. 2d 25 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) ; and Forman v. Massoni, 176 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). error ref.,
141 Tex. 679 (1944). The rule supported by the weight of authority is subject to the
criticism that it is inconsistent with the policy of establishing small claims courts having
procedures which, though less expensive to pursue and more suitable for small claims,
are not appropriate for adjudication of larger claims; see the dissenting opinion in the
Geracy case.
5 For examples of such interpretation, see Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 543, 56
S.E.2d 860, 862 (1949) ; Kelleher v. Lozzi. 7 N.J. 17. 24. 80 A.2d 196. 199 (1951).
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even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company
may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim
or suit as it deems expedient; ...
This clause grants to the company the privilege of settling de-
spite the protest of the insured.' It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the company may settle on any terms which can be
agreed upon by it and the claimant with whom it is settling.
Obviously the company's power and privilege to represent the
insured would not extend to the release, as part of the considera-
tion for the settlement, of rights of the insured which are wholly
unrelated to the accident out of which arose the claim being
settled. But with respect to the reciprocal claim of the insured
arising out of the same accident, a conffict of views has developed.
A. Has the Company a Privilege or Power to Make a Settlement
Barring Insured's Reciprocal Claim?
Most courts confronted with this problem have held that the
insured's reciprocal claim is not barred by the company's settle-
ment, the insured not having joined in the agreement, ratified it,
or authorized the company to bind him.7 Some of the opinions
reaching this result may be interpreted as not supporting a rule
stated as broadly as the preceding sentence, the courts having
declined to pass on the broader question by stating narrowly
the description of the company's settlement as one made by the
6 See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279
(1938) ; Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931) (note,
however, that insofar as this opinion indicates that the company's privilege extends even
to causing the insured's reciprocal claim to be barred, it is a minority view; see cases
cited in notes 7 and 42 infra) ; Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S.W. 751
(1917) ; Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1934) ; aff'd. 268
N.Y. 643, 198 N.E. 536 (1935) ; Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68 (1941).
7U.S.A.C. Transport, Inc. v. Corley, 202 F.2d 8 (1953) (applying Georgia law) ;
Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1954) ; Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark.
448, 248 S.W. 2d 362 (1952); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga.
App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938) ; Last v. Brams, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925) ; Burnham v.
Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S.W. 751 (1917) ; Perry v. Faulkner, 102 A.2d 908 (N.H.
1954) ; Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695 (1952) ; De Carlucci v.
Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823 (1951) ; Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc. 885, 245
N.Y. Supp. 209 (1930) ; Barron v. Smith, 33 Erie County L.J. 154 (Pa. 1949) ; Pater-
noster v. Swick, 43 Luz. L. Reg. 119 (Pa. 1953) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68
S.W.2d 127 (1933); American Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202, 108
S.W.2d 187 (1937); Wieding v. Kirsch, 271 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Hurley
v. McMillan, 268 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref., n.r.e. See Owen v. Dixon,
162 Va. 601, 175 S.E. 41 (1934). Also see Note, 32 A.L.R.2d 937 (1953).
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company over the insured's protest that he was not at fault,' or
one made without the insured's knowing of it until after con-
summation.' It may be argued that such references to protest
or lack of knowledge imply that the insured's reciprocal claim
would be barred if he knew of the proposed settlement and made
no protest.' Probably a more reasonable interpretation of each
of these opinions is that the court was merely stating factors giving
added support to its conclusion that the company's settlement
was not a bar to the insured's reciprocal claim." If it is held that
the settlement made over the protest of the insured does not bar
the insured's reciprocal claim, or that one made without the in-
sured's knowledge does not bar his claim, the same holding should
be made as to any other settlement which the insured does not
join in, ratify, or authorize. The insured should not be penalized
for knowing about the negotiation and acquiescing in the com-
pany's exercise of its privilege to settle.
12
In other opinions there is support for the proposition that the
liability insurance policy grants to the company the privilege of
making a settlement which bars the insured's reciprocal claim,
8 See Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S.W. 751 (1917) ; Jetton v. Polk,
17 Tenn. App. 395, 68 S.W.2d 127 (1933).
9 Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S.W.2d 362 (1952) ; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938) ; Perry v. Faulkner, 102 A.2d
908 (N.H. 1954); Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695 (1952); De
Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823 (1951); Paternoster v. Swick, 43
Luz. L. Reg. 119 (Pa. 1953) ; American Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App.
202, 108 S.W. 2d 187 (1937).
10 Cf. the interpretation placed on the Burnham and Jetton cases, cited supra note 8,
in Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 925, 244 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (1951).
11 In Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695 (1952), and De Carlucci v.
Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823 (1951), the courts probably took this course of
caution because it was being urged in each case that the result reached was in conflict
with the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17,
80 A.2d 196 (1951), wherein is was held that a settlement of L's claim against K and
dismissal of the suit of L v. K barred K's subsequent suit against L based on the same
intersection collision. The opinion in the Kelleher case makes no reference to the effect
of liability insurance coverage. After the decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
however, plaintiff Kelleher unsuccessfully sought a rehearing so she might show that the
settlement had been consummated by the company's attorney without her consent. Docket
No. 765 (N.J. 1951). See criticism of the decision in Note, 51 COL. L. REV. 1062 (1951).
12 Cf. Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1934), aff'd 268
N.Y. 643, 198 N.E. 536 (1935), wherein the company became insolvent after its attorney
agreed on settlement in open court but before payment was made. The court held that
the insured was not bound to pay the sum agreed upon by the company's attorney. In
response to the argument that the insured knew of the settlement agreement and made
no protest, the court, having noted the company's privilege of settlement without the
insured's consent, remarked that the insured had no reason to protest since he had not
agreed to pay anything. Id. at 394, 271 N.Y. Supp. at 747.
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without regard to whether the insured consented or, though know-
ing of the proposed settlement, failed to protest. In an Alabama
case l" defendant Kenemer interposed pleas of res judicata
founded on a Georgia judgment rendered in a suit which Kene-
mer had filed against the Alabama plaintiff, after the Alabama
suit had been commenced. The Alabama plaintiff sought to attack
collaterally the Georgia judgment on the ground that it was a
consent judgment entered pursuant to a settlement made by the
insurance company without the consent and over the protest of
the insured (the Alabama plaintiff). Though the Alabama deci-
sion against the plaintiff was rested primarily on rules limiting
collateral attacks on judgments, the court stated: ". . .it appears
by affirmative averment that, by the contract of liability insurance,
the appellant had authorized its liability carrier to employ counsel
to defend any suit in its name and to make any settlement deemed
expedient, which the insurance company did in the Georgia suit."'
14
It is a reasonable though not a necessary inference from this
passage that the company has not merely the power but also the
privilege to make a settlement by consent judgment which bars
the insured's reciprocal claim. It has been so held in Massa-
chusetts.15 If the company is privileged to accomplish this result
of barring the insured's reciprocal claim by consent judgment, it
should be privileged to accomplish the same result by an agree-
ment not incorporated into judgment, since the significant issue
is the substance of the privilege rather than the formal method
of exercising it. 6 It may be argued that the policy clause con-
cerning defense applies only to a "suit" and therefore could be
looked to only in support of the inference of a privilege to settle
after suit was filed and not before. But the inference of a privilege
is A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946).
14 Id. at 549, 25 So. 2d at 516.
15 Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931). But see Notes
59 and 60, concerning statutory modification of the Massachusetts rule.
16 But cf. Ross v. Fishtine, 277 Mass. 87, 177 N.E. 811 (1931). Though this opinion
probably should be interpreted, as supporting the distinction criticized in the text above,
it might be explained as not dealing with a plea of accord and satisfaction based on
a settlement purporting to release the insured's claim, but instead with alleged error of
the trial court in excluding an offer of proof of payment to the defendant by the insurer
and in refusing to instruct the jury that if the plaintiff paid or caused such payment
"this is such an acknowledgment of negligence and liability on the part of the plaintiff,
Ross, that the plaintiff cannot recover against the defendant, Fishtine, in this action."
Id. at 88, 177 N.E. at 811. This theory of admission of negligence was rejected by the
court on the basis that the payments showed no more than a compromise.
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to make a settlement which bars the insured's reciprocal claim
is no more readily drawn from the clause concerning defense
than from the clause concerning "settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient." 17
The better view is that the insurance policy does not grant to the
company the privilege of barring the insured's reciprocal claim
by an agreement which the insured has not otherwise joined in,
ratified, or authorized. The purpose of the policy clause grant-
ing to the company the privilege of making such settlement as
it deems expedient is to give the company control over the han-
dling of the claim against the insured. Nowhere in the policy is
the reciprocal claim referred to expressly. The error of inferring
that the policy grants to the company the privilege of barring the
insured's reciprocal claim is apparent when the consequences of
such construction are envisioned. Suppose that C asserts a claim
for $250 damages against D, the insured, and D makes a recipro-
cal claim for $100,000 damages which he has suffered. May the
company release D's $100,000 claim in consideration of C's
release of his $250 claim, with the result that the cost of settlement
to the company is nothing and the cost to the insured is the value
of his $100,000 claim? If so, the insured in these circumstances
would be in much worse position with liability insurance than
without it. Furthermore, if C also had liability insurance, recog-
nition that a liability insurance company has a privilege to re-
lease its insured's claim would enable the two insurance companies
(or the one company, if both motorists were insured in the same
company) to cancel out the reciprocal claims of C and D, leaving
each of them with no recovery though at least one may have had
an otherwise valuable claim. Whether the matter be argued as
one of "plain meaning of the language of the contract," as one
of "giving effect to the intention of the parties," or as one of
judicial interpolation to fill a gap in the policy terms, the answer
should be the same: As between the company and the insured,
the company is not granted the privilege of releasing the insured's
reciprocal claim when making such settlement "as it deems ex-
pedient" of the claim against the insured.
17 The quotation is an excerpt from the standard clause, a more extended quotation
from which appears supra, p. 2.
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A negative answer should be given also to the question whether,
as between the insured and the third party who settled with the
company, the settlement bars the insured's reciprocal claim. This
question differs from the preceding one in that here the interests
of the third party must be considered. If, however, he is not mis-
led as to whether or not the company has the privilege of barring
the insured's reciprocal claim, due protection of the interests of
such third party does not require recognition of power in the
company any broader than its privilege. It is true that the third
party (referred to as C) may be required to deal with two persons
rather than one in order to effect a complete settlement of all
tort claims between him and the insured (referred to as D)
arising out of the collision. But that is normally an advantage
to C, as compared with dealing with D only - the person with
whom he would have to deal if there had been no insurance.
Absent insurance, in whatever way C and D might adjust the
apportionment of damages, together they would bear the full loss
of their combined damages. That an insurance company is in-
volved adds to the resources of C and D another source for pay-
ment or partial payment of C's damages. Thus the chances for
settlement favorable to C are improved. There is no sound reason
for giving C the added advantage of a power in D's insurance
company to bar D's claim against C.
Can C, the claimant dealing with the company, make out a
case of apparent authority though he is unable to show that the
company was in fact authorized to bind the insured, D, as to D's
reciprocal claim? This can be done only if D is responsible for
C's being misled into reasonably believing that the company or
its representative was so authorized. The fact that D referred him
to the company or its representative when C first presented his
claim to D should not be misleading to C."8 If C does not know
the relevant incidents of the liability insurance relationship, he
should inquire. Similarly, the mere fact of representation of the
insured by an attorney employed by the company, pursuant to its
obligation to defend, should not mislead C as to the scope of
18 But cl. Selby v. Victoria Mines, 124 Mont. 321, 326, 221 P.2d 423, 425 (1950), and
the dissenting opinion in Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500,
510, 196 S.E. 279, 285 (1938).
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authority of such attorney with reference to D's reciprocal claim.'
In the foregoing discussion of the two questions of whether or
not it should be held that the company or its representative has
(1) a privilege or (2) a power to make a settlement barring the
insured's reciprocal claim, the terminology of agency has been
avoided. It merits consideration, however, since legal reasoning is
often influenced by terminology. In terms of agency doctrine, the
company and its representatives are not agents of the insured with
respect to settlement of the insured's reciprocal claim, unless
there are special arrangements between them apart from the
typical liability insurance policy."0 In fact, the company and
its representatives should not be regarded as agents of the in-
sured even with respect to settlement of the claim against the
insured 21 or with respect to defense," since the insured lacks
39 Compare the Countryman and Haluka cases discussed infra, note 21. These deci-
sions support the proposition that a settlement of the claim against the insured, nego-
tiated by an attorney employed by the company to appear as defense counsel in the suit
against the insured, does not bind the insured. A fortiori, a purported settlement of the
insured's reciprocal claim negotiated by such attorney should not bind the insured in
the absence of conduct of the insured beyond approval of the attorney's representing
him in defense.
20 Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938);
Last v. Brams, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925) ; Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194
S.W. 751 (1917) ; Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super., 95, 86 A.2d 695 (1952) ; De
Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823 (195.1) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn.
App. 395, 68 S.W. 2d 127 (1933); Hurley v. McMillan, 268 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954), error ref., n.r.e.
21 Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240
Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App.
500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938); Last v. Brams, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925) ; Haluka v. Baker,
66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68 (1941) ; Pattison v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 278
S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error ref., n.r.e.
The question whether the company is agent for the insured in settling the claim
against the insured is relevant in those cases wherein the company has become insolvent
after agreeing to settlement but before paying it, and the claimant then has sued the
insured on such settlement agreement. The insured should not be bound by such agree-
ment. Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1934), aff'd 268
N.Y. 643, 198 N.E. 536 (1935) ; Haluka v. Baker, supra. Cf. Fessler v. Weiss, 348 Ill.
App. 21, 107 N.E.2d 795 (1952) (insolvent company's attorney permitting case to go
to judgment without defense on behalf of insured; new trial granted to insured) ; Jones
v. Noble, 3 Cal. App. 2d 316, 39 P.2d 486 (1935) (solvent company refusing, on ground
of mistake, to make payment pursuant to settlement negotiated by the attorney
employed by the company to represent the insured in suit against him; settlement held
not binding on the insured in the absence of proof of his consent or approval). But cf.
Zazove v. Wilson, 334 II. App. 594, 80 N.E.2d 101 (1948) (upholding an application
by claimant's attorneys to establish against the insured an attorney's lien for 50% of
the amount agreed upon in a settlement with the claimant negotiated by the company,
the holding being based, however, not upon agency but upon insured's knowledge of
the settlement and failure to repudiate it or the benefits of the release) ; Selby v.
Victoria Mines, Inc., 124 Mont. 321, 221 P.2d 423 (1950) (suit against the insured
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that power of direction and right of control which a principal
has over an agent.2 8 Rather than right of control, the insured
has at most a cause of action for negligence or bad faith in
the handling of the defense or settlement of the claim against
the insured. 4 Though some courts have termed the relation-
ship as to defense and settlement of the claim against the in-
only on the settlement agreement, no showing of insolvency of the company being
referred to; holding that the company's claims adjuster was an agent of the insured,
and the insured was bound by his settlement agreement).
The results in the last two cases might be reconciled with the other cited cases
on the ground that the company was not a named party and the formal procedure of a
suit against the insured was approved as a means of obtaining payment from the
company, the opinions not dealing specifically with the question whether such a suit
could be maintained despite a showing by the insured that, because of insolvency of
the company, he would be required to bear the loss personally. This theory of recon-
ciliation is weak, however, since there is no obstacle to bringing suit on the settlement
agreement directly against the company; the procedural rules and the policy clause
against joinder of the company as a defendant in the tort action against the insured are
inapplicable to the contract action on the settlement agreement.
Another factual distinction is that the company's adjuster negotiated the settlement
involved in the Selby case, and the same may have been true in the Zazove case, whereas
in each of the other cited cases an attorney employed by the company to represent the
insured negotiated the settlement. In the Countryman case the decision of the Fourth
Department was based upon want of authority of an attorney, even assuming the Com-
pany's attorney to be an attorney for the insured also; an adjuster might have greater
authority. But arguably, on the other hand, there is more reason for holding the insured
bound by an agreement made by an attorney, since in the suit against the insured the
attorney appears as attorney for the insured, his employment by the company not being
disclosed of record.
22 See Fessler v. Weiss, 348 Ill. App. 21, 107 N.E.2d 795 (1952). Contra, Stephens
v. Childers, 236 N.C. 348, 72 S.E.2d 849 (1952), denying the insured's motion to set
aside a default judgment which the company negligently allowed to be entered. It does
not appear from this opinion whether the insured would be bound by a default judgment
in excess of policy coverage. If so, the insured would have a cause of action against the
company for the loss suffered by reason of such negligence with respect to the obliga-
tion to defend. Cf. Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d
82 (1937). See Note, 131 A.L.R. 1499, 1510 (1941). As to supporting the result in the
Stephens case on a basis other than regarding the company's representatives as agents
of the insured, see infra note 26. Also compare Heller v. Alter, 143 Misc. 783, 257 N.Y.S.
391 (1932), wherein the attorneys employed by the company permitted default judg-
ment after the company became insolvent, and the insured's attempt to set aside the
default judgment failed, but the court did not base its reasoning on agency doctrine.
28 See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 1, 14 (1933).
24 As to the company's liability to the insured for negligent defense, see, e.g., Abrams
v. Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937). See Note, 131
A.L.R. 1499, 1510 (1941). As to its liability for failure to settle, see e.g., Hart v.
Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949) (only good faith
required of the company) ; Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750
(1950) (at least good faith required) ; G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
nity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) (both good faith and ordinary care
required). This problem of liability for failure to settle is considered in Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1954).
Also see Note, 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
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sured one of agency,25 the results of the cases before such
courts would have been the same had the courts recognized
that the company was not an agent of the insured but rather a
non-agent fiduciary holding a power to affect the interests of
both the company and the insured, and not subject to a right
of control by the insured.2" This type of power is referred to
in the Restatement of Agency as a power given as security."
One who is an agent may hold such a power for the protection
of some interest he has as an incident of the agency relation-
ship. But he does not hold it as agent." It is equally possible
for such power to be granted to one who is not an agent. It is
submitted that this is what has been done by the provisions of
the typical liability insurance policy.
Demonstrating that the company and its representatives are
not agents of the insured does not, of course, answer the ques-
tion of whether they have the privilege or the power to make
a settlement barring his reciprocal claim. But it does indicate
that this question is not properly answered by the false as-
25 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 142 A.L.R. 799
(10th Cir. 1942) (applying Oklahoma law) ; Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee
Co., 86 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d
777 (1932); McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 231 Mo. App. 1206, 89 S.W.2d
114 (1935); Selby v. Victoria Mines, Inc., 124 Mont. 321, 221 P.2d 423 (1950);
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708, 37 A.L.R.
1477 (1924); Stephens v. Childers, 236 N.C. 348, 72 S.E.2d 849 (1952); G. A. Stowers
Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) ;
Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), on rehearing
204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931). Compare Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d
968 (1944).
26 With the exception of Hayes, Selby and Stephens the cases cited in the pre-
ceding note were concerned with the company's liability in excess of policy limits
because of its failure to settle. The company's duty in such cases is dependent on the
fact that it is a fiduciary, holding a power to affect the insured's interests as well as
its own. That duty may be found in the case of a non-agent fiduciary as readily as in
the case of one who is an agent.
The Hayes case was concerned with the question whether the insured was estopped
to plead limitation because of his company's representations during settlement negotia.
tions; the Selby case, whether the insured was subject to suit on a settlement agreement
made by the company's adjuster; and the Stephens case, whether insured could get a
default judgment set aside on the ground of excusable neglect despite the negligence
of his company in failing to cause a timely appearance on his behalf. The result in each
of these three cases, even if proper, is not dependent on a finding of agency but may
be explained as readily on the basis of a power given as security to a non-agent. Only
the power of the company's representative was at issue, and not whether it was held as
agent or as non-agent.
27 RESTATEMENT, AcENcY §§ 138, 139 (1933).
28 Cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 138, comment d, (1933), pointing out that one may
continue to hold such a power though the principal has terminated the authority which
he held as agent.
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sertions that they are agents of the insured and therefore
must have such power. On the basis of factors apart from
agency doctrine the conclusion has been reached above that,
under the preferred view of the typical situation, the company
and its representatives lack such power.
B. Settlement by the Insured
Closely related to the problem of power and privilege of
the company to make a settlement barring the insured's recip-
rocal claim is the question of whether the insured has any
obligation to the company regarding settlement of his recipro-
cal claim. The typical policy contains, in addition to the pro-
vision concerning settlement already quoted, a provision as
follows:
ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF THE INSURED
The insured shall cooperate with the company and, upon the com-
pany's request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in
effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the
attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. The insured shall
not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obligation or incur any expense other than for such immediate medical
and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of the
accident.
Insofar as it refers to settlement, this clause concerns only
the claim against the insured. It does not prohibit the insured
from making a settlement of his reciprocal claim in terms
which leave the claim against the insured unaffected.29 Also,
the insured would not commit a breach of the Assistance and
Cooperation Clause by making a settlement purporting to dis-
pose of all claims, both in his favor and against him, since
such a settlement, if having any effect on the company interests,
would be a benefit to the company.
C. Form of the Company's Settlement
In the cited cases rejecting the contention that the company's
settlement bars the insured's reciprocal claim,8" it does not
29 Utterback-Gleason Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 179 N.Y.S. 836 (1920),
aff'd 193 App. Div. 646, 184 N.Y.S. 862 (1920Y, aff'd 233 N.Y. 549, 135 N.E. 913 (1922).
30 Supra note 7.
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appear that the form of the settlement agreement influenced
the courts. The supporting theory in these case is that there
is a want of power in the company to bar the insured's recipro-
cal claim by settlement. Thus, insofar as effect on such claim
is concerned, it is immaterial whether the agreement is one
in form purporting to bar it, or purporting to reserve it, or
lacking any reference to it. But if it is held that the company
has power to make an agreement barring the insured's claim,
the form of agreement becomes important since the company
might decline to exercise such power in a particular case and
make an agreement specifically reserving the insured's claim.
D. Responsibility of Company to Insured
If, contrary to the conclusion urged in the foregoing analysis,
one accepts the view that the company is empowered to make
a settlement with a third party which bars the insured's recipro-
cal claim against the third party, another question arises. Is
the company responsible to the insured with respect to its ex-
ercise of this power? The analogy of responsibility of the
company for failing to settle the claim against the insured,
resulting in judgment against the insured for an amount in
excess of policy limits," suggests that a court would hold the
company responsible under the same standard of negligence
or bad faith as it would apply to an excess liability claim.
That is, the company's privilege as between it and the insured
probably would be held narrower than its power to make an
agreement binding as between the insured and the third party.
As to the relative weight which the company must give to its
own and the insured's conflicting interests, the most acceptable
rule would be one requiring such consideration to the two re-
ciprocal claims as it would give if it were responsible for the
full amount of any judgment against its insured and entitled
to receive the full proceeds collectible on any judgment in
favor of its insured- as if it had liability policy limits at
least as high as the claim against the insured and subrogation
rights to the full amount collectible on the insured's own claim.
31 See supra note 24.
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II. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN A SUIT DEFENDED BY THE
COMPANY ON BEHALF OF THE INSURED
A. Judgment Upon Trial
Assume, again, a collision between vehicles owned and op-
erated by C and D respectively, in which both parties suffer
personal injuries and both vehicles are damaged. Assume also,
for present purposes, that suit is first brought by C against D,
and that D's liability insurance company defends for D.
Suppose, first, the defense is successful and results in find-
ings that C was negligent and D was not. Thereafter D brings
a separate suit upon his reciprocal claim against C and asserts
that C is collaterally estopped by judgment to deny that C was
negligent or to assert that D was negligent. A "compulsory
counterclaim" rule such as Federal Rule 13(a) 8 probably
would bar D's suit. 8 Absent such a requirement for present-
ing his claim in the first suit, D would have the benefit of col-
lateral estoppel as to such questions of fact as were litigated
and determined in the first suit. Under the view adopted by the
Restatement of Judgments, this ruling would extend to both
the finding that C was negligent and the finding that D was not
negligent, if the judgment was based upon both as alternative
grounds.84 If C also has liability insurance coverage, would
the findings be binding upon C's liability insurance company,
as well as between D and C individually? Arguably not, on the
theory that C's insurance company is neither a named party nor
a participant in fact in the litigation of C v. D.35 This theory
leads to the conclusion that D could recover a judgment against
C by relying upon collateral estoppel, but' that before either
D or C could collect against C's insurance company it would
32 Rule 13. Counterclaim and Cross-claim
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need
not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject
of another pending action.
33 See infra at p. 15.
34 RESTATEI.MENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment n and illustration 8 (1942).
3-1 Cf. Bell v. Jones, 223 Ala. 497, 136 So. 826 (1931).
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be necessary to relitigate with C's insurance company the mat-
ters bearing on C's liability to D. From the point of view of the
effect on D's interests in a case wherein the insured is not fi-
nancially responsible except for his insurance coverage, it would
be unfair to require such relitigation after D had won in the
first trial unless D were also free to relitigate after he had lost.
Collateral estoppel should be applicable both for and against
D, or in neither instance. A more satisfactory method of dealing
with these problems, which arise when C has liability insur-
ance, would be to bind not only D and C by collateral estoppel
but also C's insurance company. This rule, however, should be
subject to the company's defense of breach of the assistance
and cooperation clause of the policy if C has failed to nofify
his insurance company of the litigation instituted by him, or
has improperly handled the litigation in view of its effect on
the reciprocal claim of D as well as C's own claim. Subject
to such policy defense, C's liability insurance company, hav-
ing agreed to insure C as to amounts he is legally obligated to
pay, should be bound by whatever is binding on C.
Suppose, next, that in the suit of C v. D the latter's liability
insurance company defends for him and loses. If D thereafter
asserts his reciprocal claim against C, is D's claim defeated
by the judgment in the suit of C v. D? On the theory of col-
lateral estoppel by judgment, this question has been answered
affirmatively by one court." This result is supported by the
policy against multiplicity of suits, which policy also supports
application of a compulsory counterclaim rule such as Fed-
eral Rule 13(a)." Do the incidents of liability insurance make
this result unsound in insurance cases?
s6 A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So.2d 511 (1946).
37 Under the view adopted in RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942 and 1948 Supp.),
collateral estoppel applies only with respect to issues actually litigated and essential
to the judgment. The compulsory counterclaim risk, on the other hand, has more
sweeping effect. Where there is such a risk, one who fails to assert his counterclaim,
in the original suit wherein he is defendant, is thereafter precluded under a doctrine
in the nature of merger or bar. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58, and § 68, comment
a (1942 and 1948 Supp.) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1,
10-15, 22-27 (1942). The claim and counterclaim are treated as if they were parts of
a single cause of action, and subject to the rule against splitting.
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(1) Who Are "Parties" Under Compulsory
Counterclaim Rules?
Federal Rule 13(a) appears on its face to apply to the hypo-
thetical case of C v. D. D's reciprocal claim is a "claim which
at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
[an] opposing party," namely C, arising "out of the transac-
tion or occurence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction," and the exception for a claim "which is the sub-
ject of another action pending when this action was commenced
is inapplicable. Typically the insurance company is not a formal
party to the suit. Even where it is permissible to join the com-
pany, normally the insured (D) is also named as a party. It
might be urged, however, that Federal Rule 13(a) should not
be construed to apply to the reciprocal claim of D since, look-
ing through the form which names only D as defendant, we
find that the claim of C will be satisfied in whole or part by
the company and is being defended by the company under a
policy which grants to it control over that defense even as
against D, the named defendant. In reality, though not in form,
the defense pleader is the company, whereas it is D who has
the claim in question against A. By the same line of reasoning,
if C also has liability insurance, D's reciprocal claim is not
a claim against the opposing party (C) since in reality the
claim is to be satisfied wholly or partly by C's insurance com-
pany. In those jurisdictions where it is improper to join the
company in the tort suit against its insured, it might also be
argued that when we look through form to identify the parties
interested, D's claim requires for its adjudication the presence
of a third party of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
These arguments against application of Federal Rule 13(a)
to the hypothetical suit of C v. D probably should not prevail,
however. An important purpose of the rule is to consolidate
into one proceeding the litigation of numerous claims from
a single accident. That purpose is applicable whether only C
and D are interested, or they and also their insurnace compa-
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nies are interested. As for the argument that the court may not
acquire jurisdiction over the companies in this proceeding, the
purpose of the rules declaring them not to be proper parties
is to avoid jury bias against insurance companies. If we look
through form to find that they are persons interested in the
claims, we should also look through form to find that they are
in practical effect parties to the litigation, since they are de-
fending for their own interests and on behalf of the insureds,
though only their insureds are named as defendants.
(2) Conflicting Interests of Company and Insured
Concerning Trial
A conflict of interests may arise between the company and
its insured, D, with respect to the conduct of (1) litigation in
which both C's claim against D and D's claim against C are
at issue or (2) litigation placing at issue one of these claims
and collaterally affecting the other. Both the company and its
insured, D, are interested in proving that C was negligent and
that D was not. Their interests do not always coincide, how-
ever. For example, in a jurisdiction where contributory negli-
gence is a complete bar, the company's interests are as well
served by findings of negligence against both C and D as by
findings against C alone, but D's interests in his reciprocal claim
are served only by findings against C alone. This difference of
interests might affect tactical decisions during trial. D would
favor urging as negligence only those grounds with respect to
which his conduct leading up to the collision was demonstrably
superior to that of C; the company, on the other hand, might
favor urging additional grounds of negligence as to which the
conduct of C and D was equally subject to criticism. Suppose
the collision occurred in dense fog and neither driver was on
an emergency mission; D would not want to urge as negligence
the mere fact of driving in such dense fog for other than an
emergency mission, but the company might want to urge this
ground (unless tactical considerations caused the company to
prefer giving up the chance of winning the case on this theory
in order to improve chances of winning on another theory).
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Similarly, after trial and judgment, a conflict of interests may
arise concerning the advisability of appeal. Assume a judg-
ment against D for $5,000 on a claim as to which D has $5,000
coverage. It may be that the company desires to appeal, while
D prefers that there be no appeal because the judgment on the
new trial might be higher than his coverage. 8 Or assume another
situation, in which judgment has been entered that C recover
$3,900 oii his claim against D and that D take nothing on his
reciprocal claim. Though the company may prefer to pay off
the $3,900 and incur no more legal expense, D may prefer to
appeal in the hope of obtaining a new trial and thereafter a
favorable judgment on his claim against C. 9
In order to deal effectively with the problem of such con-
flicts of interest of the company and the insured, the courts
might either (1) provide for separate trials of the two recipro-
cal claims of C v. D and D v. C, neither to affect the other by
collateral estoppel, or else (2) provide for a single trial to
determine both claims and recognize mutual obligations of D
and his insurance company to respect each other's interests.
The first alternatiVe could be implemented by denying the ap-
plicability of a compulsory counterclaim rule (or else order-
ing a severance for trial purposes if the compulsory counter-
claim rule is held applicable) and denying applicability of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel on the theory that the interested
parties are not the same. The second alternative could be im-
plemented by applying a compulsory counterclaim rule and
requiring a single trial, or else by applying the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel, and supplementing either of these methods
of trial of the tort claims with a rule of mutual obligations of
the company and the insured to respect each other's interests.
Probably the second of these two ways of dealing with the
problem of conflicting interests of the company and the insured
should be adopted, because the first is inconsistent with the
38 This situation was considered in the opinion in Davison v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
197 Mass. 167, 83 N.E. 407 (1908); the court, applying the Massachusetts rule as
to conflict between interests of the company and the insured, stated that the company
had the privilege of appealing to protect its own interests, even though the insured's
interests might be prejudiced by the additional legal proceedings.
s9 See Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950) discussed infra,
text following note 57.
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policy in favor of litigation of a single fact question between
the same parties only once - a policy underlying both the
compulsory counterclaim rule and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. If this policy does not prevail, the same fact ques-
tion may be decided with two conflicting results in the two
different trials -a circumstance which, at the least, is a dis-
turbing indication of the imperfection of our judicial processes.
(That imperfection remains, though somewhat less obviously
demonstrable, if the finding in the first trial is conclusive. Per-
haps the risk of erroneous adjudication can be reduced, how-
ever, if the advocacy for all conflicting interest is brought to
bear in a single proceeding, either directly by the appearance
of separate attorneys for the company and the insured, or in-
directly by cooperation of the company and the insured in
choosing a single presentation acceptable to both, or, if one of
the claims goes to trial ahead of the other, by a presentation
at the instance of one who has been forced to give due con-
sideration to the other's interests because of the threat of lia-
bility for disregarding them.
Whether the single trial which affects both claims is one in
which both claims are at issue, or instead is one in which one
claim only is at issue and the other is collaterally affected, the
company and the insured might be held to mutual obligations
'to give to each of their respective interests that degree of weight,
relative to the conflicting interest, that would be given by an
individual holding both interests. Though there are some opin-
ions which in principle appear to be opposed to such a rule of
mutual obligations," the analogy to the company's obligation
with respect to liability in excess of policy limits for failure to
settle " supports this rule. Admittedly such a rule presents
difficulties of enforcement because many of the applications
will concern matters of good judgment in the handling of claims.
Recognition of such a rule of mutual obligation seems fairer,
however, than giving priority to either the interests of the in-
sured or the interests of the company, where the two have come
into conflict with respect to a matter not governed by the ex-
40 E.g., Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82
(1937).
41 See supra note 24.
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pressions in the insurance policy. Also, because of the public
interest and interest of litigants generally against multiple trials
over a single fact situation, this rule seems preferable to elimi-
nation of the conflict of interests by providing a procedure for
separate trials, neither of which would affect collaterally the
claim at issue in the other.
B. Consent Judgment
(1) The Nature of the Problem
In a number of cases it has been urged that a prior consent
judgment on the claim against the insured, agreed upon by the
claimant and the attorney employed by the insurance com-
pany, defeats the insured's reciprocal claim. The insured re-
sponds by attempting to show that he did not personally par-
ticipate in the agreement, and by urging that the judgment
entered upon consent of the attorney employed by the company
should not be binding upon him, the insured. In several cases con-
cerned with the question, this contention of the insured has been
sustained,"2 but the contrary view has been applied elsewhere.'
One theory offered against the insured and in support of a
ruling that such a consent judgment defeats the insured's re-
ciprocal claim is that the insurance policy grants to the com-
pany the privilege of extinguishing the insured's claim in this
manner. Though having some judicial support," this theory is
subject to substantially the same criticism as that offered above45
with respect to construing the policy as granting to the company
the privilege of extinguishing the insured's reciprocal claim by
settlement without entry of judgment. The reciprocal claim of
the insured is not referred to in the policy; the clause concern-
ing defense and settlement by the company is properly con-
strued as relating only to claims against the insured. No policy
42 Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1954) ; Perry v. Faulkner,
102 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1954); De Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823
(1951); Barron v. Smith, 33 Erie County L.J. 154 (Pa. 1949); American Trust &
Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202, 108 S.W.2d 187 (1937). See Owen v. Dixon,
162 Va. 601, 175 S.E. 41 (1934).
43 A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 549, 25 So.2d 511, 516 (1946).
44 E.g., Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
45 Supra text following note 17.
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clause spells out a power in the company to cause its attorney
to appear on behalf of the insured and consent to judgment
against him; such power as is implied in the provisions con-
cerning defense and settlement by the company is limited to
the company's consenting to a judgment which affects only the
claim against the insured, and not to one defeating the insured's
reciprocal claim."
A second theory supporting the recognition of a consent
judgment in the suit against the insured as defeating the in-
sured's reciprocal claim is that the interests favoring stability
of judgments require that the insured not be permitted to go
behind a judgment to show that in fact it was entered under cir-
cumstances different from those indicated on the face of the
judgment. 7 This theory may lead to different collateral effects
of various consent judgments depending on the circumstances
and the recitations in the particular judgment. Several possi-
bilities will be considered.
(2) Full Disclosure on the Face of the Judgment
Absent an applicable compulsory counterclaim rule, 4" if the
consent judgment discloses on its face that it is entered pursu-
46 Cf. 7th Report, Judicial Council of Mass., 32-33 (1931) :
... The purposes of any agreement giving an insurance company authority to
defend do not extend beyond the requirements of defense. Those requirements
to protect both the company and the defendant in case of settlement may be
covered by securing a covenant not to sue in a case settled before suit has been
brought and in a case settled after suit brought by securing a covenant not to
sue again and an agreement that judgment shall be entered for "neither" party
in the suit which is pending. These are agreements commonly used in these cases.
It is, nevertheless, true that an attorney for an insurance company who enters
his appearance for a defendant in a damage suit in accordance with the policy
agreement has apparent authority on the records of the court to agree to the
entry of judgment against his client. It is reasonable that there should be some
method of protection against such action unless the defendant specifically agrees
to it.
Confronted with the decision in Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930),
holding that a consent judgment entered in the suit against insured is a bar to the
suit by insured on his reciprocal claim, the Judicial Council recommended a change
by statute. See in/ra, notes 59 and 60. In the absence of troublesome precedents such
as the Biggio case, a better solution is to construe the policy clause concerning defense
and settlement as limited to the requirements of defense of the claim against the
insured, a construction consistent with both the purpose and the language of the
insurance policy. Cf. cases cited supra note 42.
47 See e.g., Perry v. Faulkner, 102 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1954); La Londe v. Hubbard,
202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359 (1932).
48 Discussed infra, text following note 54.
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ant to a compromise agreement between the claimant and the
company only, the insured not being a party to the agreement,
there is no sound reason for giving such judgment any greater
or different effect on the insured's reciprocal claim than the
settlement alone would have had. Such facts having been recited,
it should be immaterial whether the consent judgment is, on the
one hand, a dismissal or an adjudication that plaintiff take
nothing, the consideration for settlement having been paid, or
on the other hand is a judgment awarding the plaintiff a re-
covery and specifying that it is done upon the basis of the
compromise agreement. In either of such cases the judgment
on its face does not purport to adjudicate any issue not con-
trolled by a compromise between the claimant and the com-
pany only.
(3) False Recitations that the Case Was Adjudicated on
the Merits or that the Insured Consented to Judgment
Frequently the consent judgment does not disclose that it
was entered pursuant to a compromise agreement to which the
insured was not a party. If it purports to award plaintiff a
recovery on the tort claim against the insured, as distinguished
from awarding a recovery on the compromise agreement, the
interest in stability of judgments points to the conclusion that,
unless the judgment is subject to being reformed or explained,
it should be given the same effect as a judgment which was in
fact entered upon the merits after trial.49 Similarly, if it pur-
ports to be a judgment entered upon consent of the insured, this
interest in stability of judgments points to giving such judg-
ment that effect it would have had if the recitations of consent
by the insured had been accurate.
There is some support, however, for the proposition that the
insured may show collaterally, in the insured's suit on his re-
ciprocal claim, that the consent judgment urged against his
49 Cf. A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So.2d 511 (1946),
where the majority treated the foreign judgment as if it had been entered after trial
on the merits, refusing to permit collateral impeachment of the judgment by proof that
it was a consent judgment pursuant to a compromise, by the defense attorney employed
by the insurance company, without insured's participation or consent.
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claim was entered by consent of his insurance company, the
insured not being a party to the agreement, and therefore that
it does not affect the insured's reciprocal claim." Probably
such a collateral showing that the insured was not a party to
the agreement should be permitted, even though opposed to
rules generally applicable to collateral attack on a judgment,5
because of the prevalence of liability insurance coverage and
of the practice of drafting judgments as if the insured were
personally participating in the compromise when in fact the
insurance company alone is exercising its privilege to settle
as it seems expedient. These factors combine to cause false in-
dications of consent by the insured in a substantially greater
percentage of judgments than is true in non-insurance cases,
and thus weightier considerations are presented than in non-
insurance cases to counterbalance the interests in stability of
judgments. If the requisites for a successful direct attack can be
satisfied, however, the safer course for the insured to pursue
is to bring a direct attack upon the consent judgment for the
purpose of having it reformed to disclose that the insured was
not a party to the settlement agreement.5
A difficulty which the insured encounters in attacking a judg-
ment entered against him by agreement between the plaintiff
and the company is that the court may look upon the situation
5o Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1954) ; semble American
Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202, 108 S.W.2d 187 (1937). Cl.
Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17, 80 A.2d 196 (1951), not referring to the effect of insurance,
but holding that extrinsic evidence may be received in a suit by A v. B to show that
suit of B v. A was in fact a dismissal upon settlement and therefore not "without
prejudice." Nevertheless, the effort to get a rehearing so plaintiff Kelleher might show
that settlement had been consummated by the company's attorney without her consent
was unsuccessful. Docket No. 765 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1951).
51 Assume that the judgment was in favor of C against D, the insured. It is generally
held that D may attack collaterally by showing that the judgment was rendered on
the appearance of an attorney lacking authority though purporting to represent D. See
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 12, comment c (1942). But the present problem involves
not lack of any authority to appear for the attacking party, but rather conduct in
excess of authority. The attorney has authority to appear on behalf of D as to defense,
though it should be held that the insurance policy does not authorize him to act on
behalf of D as to D's reciprocal claim.
52 Such direct attack on the consent judgment is required by the following decisions:
Perry v. Faulkner, 102 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1954) ; LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164
S.E. 359 (1932). See Comment, 32 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1954). As to the requisites for
direct and collateral attacks on judgments generally, see RESTATEMENTS, JUDGMENTS
§§ 11, 12 (1942).
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as analogous to the non-insurance case in which the attorney
for a party agrees to entry of a judgment which the party there-
after attacks.5" There is a difference in that the company's right
of control over the defense as it affects the reciprocal claim
is subject to limitations not involved in the non-insurance case
in which the party is represented by an attorney of his own se-
lection. When the judgment has been entered upon an agree-
ment between the third party and the company, the third party
has not been misled by the insured with respect to the scope of
the authority of the company and the attorney it has employed
to represent the insured, reformation of the judgment upon
attack by the insured should be favored, at least in the ab-
sence of want of reasonable diligence on the part of the in-
sured to present his contentions before entry of the judgment.
If neither the requisites for collateral attack nor those for
direct attack can be satisfied, there remains a possibility that
the insured may get relief through a cause of action against
the company. The proper handling of the defense by the com-
pany would require that it not agree to a type of judgment which
would bar the insured's reciprocal claim, but rather that it
insist on a judgment disclosing that it is entered merely on the
basis of a compromise agreement not affecting the reciprocal
claim. Subject to possible defenses (e.g., contributory fault
in failing to make a timely attack on the judgment), the com-
pany should be liable to the insured for loss sustained by
reason of such improper handling of the defense. An analogy
supporting this result may be found in the cases imposing lia-
bility on the company for the loss to the insured in the form
of liability to the claimant which he would not have suffered
but for the improper handling of the defense or improper
failure to settle. 4 Liberalizing the provisions for attack on
53 E.g., see Hubley v. Goodwin, 91 N.H. 200, 17 A.2d 96 (1940). But cf. Perry v.
Faulkner, 102 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1954). The two decisions can be reconciled on the
basis of insufficiency of the evidence in Hubley to show that he did not consent to or
that he did not know about the proposed settlement, or on the basis that one attorney
represented defendants in the prior suit involved in Hubley, whereas the insured had
her separate attorney to represent her in the prosecution of her reciprocal claim in
Perry. The later (Perry) opinion may be interpreted, however, as indicating greater
inclination toward favoring reformation of the former judgment to make it no bar to
the insured's reciprocal claim.
54 See supra, note 24.
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judgments is a more satisfactory solution to this problem,
however, than the alternative of defeating the insured's (D's)
reciprocal claim against C (the party settling with D's insurance
company) and allowing D a cause of action against the com-
pany. The alternative makes D whole, but it leaves the ultimate
cost of D's reciprocal claim on D's insurance company, rather
than on C or C's insurance company, where it should fall unless
D or D's insurance company misled C as to the authority of
the person he dealt with.
This troublesome problem of the consent judgment falsely
indicating that the insured personally joined in the settlement
agreement should arise less frequently as attorneys and insur-
ance companies become increasingly aware of the risks in-
volved in the practice of drafting judgments in this form.
(4) Effect of a Compulsory Counterclaim Rule
In jurisdictions having a "compulsory counterclaim" rule,
such as Federal Rule 13 (a), a consent judgment presents added
hazards for the insured. Frequently, when a minor is a claim-
ant, settlement is effected by a "friendly suit" filed solely for
the purpose of incorporating the compromise agreement into
judgment, in order to make it binding on the minor. If the
compulsory counterclaim rule is applied to such a situation,
the insured's reciprocal claim is barred because of his failure
to assert it in the "friendly suit." The rule should be held
inapplicable to such a "friendly suit," which is in fact not a
suit in the ordinary sense but rather a procedure for having
a compromise approved by a court. If the judgment does not
disclose that such is the nature of the suit, it may be necessary
for the insured to get it reformed, but, again, reformation
should be favored.
A different problem is presented by a consent judgment
entered after the insured was served, turned over the defense
to the company, and filed no counterclaim. The interest in bring-
ing all related claims into a single litigation supports a ruling
that the insured's reciprocal claim is barred in these circum-
stances unless he is able to litigate the claim under one of the
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saving provisions of the compulsory counterclaim rule.5" Typi-
cally such rules contain a provision substantially as follows:
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, in-
advertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by
leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.'0
Failure of the attorney employed by the company to advise the
insured of the existence and effect of the compulsory counter-
claim rule should not be held against the insured. If this view
is accepted, and if the insured is permitted to have a consent
judgment reopened to allow the filing of his counterclaim when
he failed to file it "through oversight, inadvertence, or excus-
able neglect, or when justice requires," adequate protection
for the interests of the insured is available. Probably such re-
lief from the judgment is available in the federal courts under
Rule 60(b).
If relief is not available to the insured and his reciprocal
claim is barred because of the judgment to which the attorney
employed by the company consented on behalf of the insured,
the company should be subject to liability to the insured. Prob-
ably contributory fault of the insured should be a defense. But
if the insured is unfamiliar with incidents of the liability in-
surance relationship and has been misled into relying on the
attorney as his own, it would be reasonable to hold the com-
pany responsible unless its attorney makes known to the insured
the limited scope of the attorney's representation of his in-
terests; absent such notice, the insured may be misled to believe
that the attorney will protect all his interests relating to the
accident.
(5) Consent Judgment After Trial
What effect should be given to the consent judgment entered
after verdict or judgment on the merits but before such judg-
55 Cf. Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951). See supra, text
following note 37, as to the argument that a compulsory counterclaim rule should be
held inapplicable to a tort defendant with liability insurance, on the theory that the
liability insurance company and not the named defendant is the real party defendant.
56Fxo. R. Civ. PRO. 13(f). Cf. Tsx. R. CIv. PRO. 97, which is patterned after
Federal Rule 13 but omits subdivision (f) of that rule; the omission may be of little
or no significance in view of the liberal provision for amendments made in Texas
Rules 62-67.
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ment becomes final, or to a judgment from which the company
declines to appeal though good grounds for appeal are avail-
able?
In Ross v. Stricker,57 judgment was entered on a verdict for
Ross in the amount of $5,000 and against Stricker on his
counterclaim. The trial court held that Stricker's motion for
new trial would be overruled if Ross filed a remittitur of
$1,100, which he promptly did. Stricker's insurer then paid
the $3,900, and an entry of satisfaction of the judgment was
placed on record. At that point an entry was made authorizing
the withdrawal of the attorney employed by the insurance com-
pany, and the insured's personal attorney took up the repre-
sentation. He sought and obtained a modification of the entry
of satisfaction of judgment to show that it was paid by the in-
surance company, and then he appealed. Though the Court
of Appeals found that error had been committed in the admis-
sion of evidence over Stricker's objection, and ordered a new
trial, the Supreme Court of Ohio held for Ross on the cross-
petition. The theory of the supreme court was that the judgment
for Ross on his claim became final, and was conclusive between
the parties as to the Stricker cross-petition since it determined
that Stricker was negligent and Ross was not.5"
The Ross opinion may be interpreted as placing the deci-
sion not upon any procedural irregularity about the method
of attempted appeal, but upon the proposition that, when the
company chose to pay the $3,900 judgment, there was nothing
Stricker could do to protect against the finality of the judgment
and its conclusiveness on this cross-petition. Also, since the
supporting theory is collateral estoppel, the result appears not
to be dependent upon the fact that both reciprocal claims had
been presented in one suit. This proposition that Stricker was
helpless in the face of such settlement is subject to the criticism
that it permits the company to defeat the insured's reciprocal
claim by a payment which is no more indicative of the proper
determination of the insured's reciprocal claim than would
be the same payment by the company before trial. Suppose,
5T 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950).
58 Id. at 159, 91 N.E.2d at 22. See, for subsequent developments, State ex rel Ross v.
Judges, 159 Ohio St. 444, 112 N.E.2d 325 (1953).
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as the Court of Appeals held, a reversible error had been com-
mitted during trial. Under these circumstances the effect is
to give to the company's decision to waive new trial the effect
of an adjudication on the merits. The opinion does not indicate
whether a pre-trial settlement by the company would have
barred the insured's reciprocal claim, but the court's reliance
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel suggests that a distinction
was being made between the Ross case and a settlement before
suit, and perhaps also between the Ross case and a settlement
after filing a suit but before judgment.
In another jurisdiction, Massachusetts, a distinction is made
by statute between a consent judgment entered "without a hear-
ing on the merits" and one entered after such hearing. 9 The
former does not bar the reciprocal claim unless the settlement
agreement is signed by the insured in person. The distinction
has grown out of a history of court decisions in that state giving
a consent judgment the effect of barring the insured's recipro-
cal claim and of statutes modifying that rule.6"
In support of this distinction between the consent judgment
without hearing on the merits and that after hearing, it may
be noted that most settlements after hearing of the claim are
the result of token reductions by the winning plaintiff in order
to avoid the delay of appeal and a minimal chance of reversal.
Also, such token reductions are agreed upon in a high per-
centage of the litigated cases, with the result that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel by judgment, if inapplicable to this type
of consent judgment, would rarely be operative against re-
ciprocal claims. This would mean an increase in the number of
instances in which a single accident would give rise to two or
more trials. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that the results of
the two trials would often be inconsistent, prejudice against
insurance companies leading to results favorable to both claim-
ants even though the legal effect of contributory negligence
59 Mass. Act, 1947, c. 431, § 1; Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 231, § 140A (1933, as amended
1947).
60 The development may be traced in the following sequence of cases and legisla-
tion: Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930); Long v. MacDougall, 273
Mass. 386, 173 N.E. 507 (1930) ; Ross v. Fishtine, 277 Mass. 87, 177 N.E. 811 (1931);
Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931) ; Mass. Acts 1932,
c. 130 § 1 (Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 231, § 140A); Macheras v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass.
485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946) ; 22nd Report, Judicial Council of Mass., 80-81 (1946).
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would make this result impossible if the rights of the parties
were determined on the basis of a single set of consistent find-
ings. But giving the consent judgment after hearing the effect
of defeating the reciprocal claim will also operate unjustly
in some cases. For example, suppose a case in which there
were substantial grounds for new trial and the plaintiff in the
suit against the insured accepted a substantial reduction rather
than risking appeal.6 Though it was doubtful whether the find-
ings supporting the judgment on the merits were fairly and
properly reached, and that fact was fairly reflected in the set-
tlement between the plaintiff and the company, those findings
would be given the effect of defeating the reciprocal claim.
The trial was inconclusive as to the claim of the plaintiff against
the insured; it should not be given conclusive effect as to the
insured's reciprocal claim.
Perhaps the Ross case is to be explained on procedural irregu-
larities, and in Ohio, absent such irregularities, consent judgment
or an entry of satisfaction of judgment by the company would not
be given the effect of defeating the insured's reciprocal claim in
circumstances such as these. Perhaps even in Massachusetts the
court will avoid giving a consent judgment the effect of defeating
the insured's reciprocal claim in such circumstances, by holding
that the judgment is entered "without hearing on the merits" if
there were indications of real doubt as to whether the attempted
hearing was effective; but that interpretation appears improbable
in view of the history of the court's inclination to give the con-
sent judgment the effect of defeating the reciprocal claim. In
jurisdictions not concerned with this problem of statutory in-
terpretation, however, a better solution for the problem would
be a rule which would not give such effect to an agreed dispo-
sition of the case without the insured's participation, if there
was substantial doubt about the granting of a new trial.
When both reciprocal claims have been presented in one suit,
it should be held necessary that all interested persons join in
61 E.g., see Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va. 601, 175 S.E. 41 (1934). The opinion in this
case contains some language lending support to the conclusion that a consent judgment
entered upon the company's settlement with the claimant pending appeal does not bar
the insured's reciprocal claim. The court decision, however, was placed on the ground
that the plaintiff in the former suit, a passenger in the car of the defendants in the
instant suit, was a stranger to the instant suit.
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any consent disposing of the entire case, though (as to such con-
sent judgment after hearing on the merits, at least) the opinion
of the Ohio court in the Ross case may be intepreted as oppos-
ing this view. Settlement of one claim alone would not be pre-
cluded, however. Such settlement could be made after hearing
on the merits, by agreement not incorporated into a judgment
terminating the whole litigation, just as this could have been
done before such hearing.62 Admittedly this leaves open the
possibility of inconsistent results by way of recoveries by both
claimants. This is a possibility, however, which is inherent in
the opportunity to settle, even before suit is filed, and should
be accepted to gain the many advantages to the public and to
the litigants from the opportunities for compromising rather
than litigating claims.
III. RECOMMENDED RULES OF DECISION
In each subdivision of this article a preferred solution has
been suggested for the problem considered there. The several
problems are so related that a sound solution for one is in many
instances dependent on the answers given to others. If the recom-
mended solutions are accepted, the following set of rules of de-
cision would be effective where reciprocal claims arise from a
collision and liability insurance coverage was in effect with re-
spect to the operation of one or both of the colliding vehicles.
1. A compromise settlement, without court proceedings, of a
claim against the insured, agreed upon by the insurance com-
pany and the person claiming against the insured, has no legal
effect upon the insured's reciprocal claim against such other
person, unless such person has been misled by the insured as
to the scope of authority of the company or its representatives
to act on behalf of the insured. The unusual case in which the
person settling with the company has been misled by the insured
as to such scope of authority will be determined on the basis
of doctrines generally applicable to claims of apparent authority.
2. The insured's settlement of his own claim against a third
62 For examples of such settlement before hearing on the merits but after the
filing of suit and counterclaim, see De Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N.J. Super. 48, 83 A.2d
823 (1951) ; Barron v. Smith, 33 Erie County LJ. 154 (Pa. 1949).
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person, either on terms which bar that person's reciprocal claim
against the insured or on terms which reserve that reciprocal
claim and make no other agreement concerning it, is not a
breach of the assistance and cooperation clause of the liability
insurance policy.
3. A judgment on the merits as to one claim has the same
effect on the reciprocal claim as it would be accorded (under
rules pertaining to collateral estoppel and compulsory counter-
claims) if no liability insurance were involved.
4. Since, under the third rule, conflicting interests of the com-
pany and the insured are subject to being affected by an adjudi-
cation of either the claim against the insured or the insured's
reciprocal claim, the company and the insured have mutual ob-
ligations, with respect to conducting such litigation, to give to
the interests of each that degree of weight that would be given
by an individual holding both interests.
5. A consent judgment indicating on its face that it was en-
tered upon compromise of the claim against the insured by
agreement between the claimant and the insurance company has
no greater effect on the insured's reciprocal claim than the com-
promise settlement alone would have had. This rule applies re-
gardless of whether the consent judgment is entered before
trial, or after trial but before judgment has become final, ex-
cept that as to a consent judgment against the insured after
trial, collateral estoppel is operative unless there was substan-
tial doubt that the adverse trial judgment or verdict would stand
against a motion for new trial on behalf of the insured.
6. A judgment purporting to be an adjudication on the merits,
or purporting to be entered pursuant to a compromise disposing
of both the claim against the insured and the insured's recipro-
cal claim, is subject to reformation, either by direct attack, or
by collateral attack in the suit of the insured on his reciprocal
claim, for the purpose of showing that it was a consent judg-
ment entered without the insured's agreeing that it should bar his
reciprocal claim. The effect of the judgment, as reformed, is de-
termined by the rules stated above.
7. A compulsory counterclaim rule is inapplicable to a
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"friendly suit" filed solely for the purpose of consumating a
settlement between the company and the claimant.
8. Except as to a "friendly suit," a compulsory counterclaim
rule is applicable though one or both of the named parties have
liability insurance. But failure of the company and the attorney
employed by the company to advise the insured of the existence
and effect of a compulsory counterclaim rule is not to be held
against the insured, and a judgment is subject to being reopened
at the instance of the insured for the purpose of setting up his
counterclaim by amendment, if he failed to set it up through
oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect.
